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Abstract 
 
In the process of impeachment, Constitutional Court has the obligation to give its judgement to House 
of Representatives’s opinion regarding allegation of violation by the President and/or Vice President. 
Constitutional Court checks and judges House of Representatives’s opinion on whether or not the 
President and/or Vice President works fulfill Article 7A of Constitution of Republic Indonesia 1945 
(UUD NRI 1945). The inspection done by Constitutional Court is the judicial process whose decision is 
in the form of justisil. The result of this impeachment process heavily depends on the judgement of 
People's Consultative Assembly in its plenary meeting which is also a politics forum, where President 
and/or Vice President could be dismissed or not. Constitutional Court’s judgement does not apply to 
People's Consultative Assembly, hence, the difference of Constitutional Court and People's Consulta-
tive Assembly’s judgement in plenary meeting that is very political by its nature is very likely to 
happen. Involvement of Constitutional Court in the procss of impeachment is, of course, different in 
each country. It depends on governance system in that particular country, it also relies on how much 
authority that is given by Constitution to Constitutional Court in the process of impeachment itself.  
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Abstrak 
 
Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam proses pemakzulan mempunyai kewajiban memberikan putusan atas 
pendapat DPR mengenai dugaan pelanggaran oleh Presiden dan/atau Wakil Presiden. Mahkamah 
Konstitusi memeriksa dan mengadili pendapat DPR atas kinerja Presiden dan/atau Wakil Presiden yang 
dianggap memenuhi Pasal 7A UUD NRI 1945. Pemeriksaan yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi 
merupakan proses peradilan yang putusannya berupa putusan justisil. Hasil dari proses pemakzulan 
sangat bergantung pada keputusan MPR dalam rapat paripurna yang merupakan forum politik, di mana 
Presiden dan/atau Wakil Presiden dapat diberhentikan atau tidak diberhentikan. Putusan Mahkamah 
Konstitusi tidak mengikat MPR sehingga sangat memungkinkan adanya perbedaan antara putusan yuridis 
yang dikeluarkan Mahkamah Konstitusi dengan keputusan MPR dalam rapat paripurna yang bersifat 
politis. Keterlibatan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam proses pemakzulan berbeda di masing-masing negara, 
tergantung pada sistem pemerintahan yang dimiliki oleh negara tersebut, serta bergantung pada 
kewenangan yang diberikan oleh Konstitusi kepada Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam proses pemakzulan. 
 
Kata kunci: kewenangan, mahkamah konstitusi, pemakzulan 
 
 
Introduction 
The idea of a constitutional state was built 
by legal development as a system that functional 
and equitable, developed by arranging super-
structure and infrastructure of political institu-
tional, economic and social orderly and organi- 
 
Ω  This artikel is part of research by Policy of Faculty/Ma-
jority/Study Program funded by DIPA Universitas Negeri 
Surabaya fiscal year 2015, decree of Rector UNESA No. 
418/UN38/HK/LT/2015. 
 
zed, as well as fostered by creating cultural and 
legal awareness of rational and imperonal in the 
national and state life. Hence, the legal system 
needs to be built (law making) and enforced (law 
enforcement) as it should be, starting with the 
constitution as the highest legal position. To en-
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sure the enforcement of the constitution as "the 
guardian of the constitution".1 
The Constitution is a form of agreement of 
all the people (general agreement) associated 
with building an idealized state. Constitution 
applies as the supreme law because it is the hig-
hest form of social contract of all sovereign peo-
ple in a country. Thus, changing the constitution 
is also a change in the social contract in accor-
dance with the development and the experience 
of that society.2 Constitution 1945 (UUD 1945) 
changes an essential prerequisite for building the 
constitutional system and more democratic poli-
tical system that puts forward the sovereignty of 
the people, balances (checks and balances) bet-
ween branches of power and guarantee of human 
rights. UUD 1945 change is one of the important 
and fundamental step to oversee the reform and 
to deliver the Indonesian nation towards consoli-
dated democracy.3 
UUD 1945 has undergone fundamental cha-
nge, which is the establishment of the Constitu-
tional Court (further referred as MK) specified in 
Section 7B, Article 24 and Article 24C of the 
Constitution 1945 (further referred as the UUD 
NRI 1945). This newly state institution is a mani-
festation of the power of authority of its own 
outside of the Supreme Court.4 Based on the 
amendment of UUD NRI 1945, the Constitutional 
Court has the authority to test the Constitution, 
to decide on dispute of the state institutions au-
thority, the dissolution of political parties, dispu-
tes of results of the election, and to examine, 
judge, and decide upon the opinion of the House 
of Representatives (DPR) regarding to alleged 
violations of the law by the President and/or Vice 
President based on UUD NRI 1945. 
The idea of the establishment of the Cons-
titutional Court started from the debate of the 
                                         
1  Aninditya Eka Bintari, ”Mahkamah Konstitusi sebagai Ne-
gative Legislator dalam Penegakan Hukum Tata Negara”, 
Jurnal Pandecta, Vol. 8 No. 1, January 2013, Semarang: 
Faculty of Law Universitas Negeri Semarang, page 84. 
2  Weldy Agiwinata, “Konvensi Ketatanegaraan sebagai Batu 
Uji dalam Pengujian Undang-Undang di Mahkamah Konsti-
tusi”, Jurnal Yuridika, Vol. 29 No. 2, May 2014, Surabaya: 
Faculty of Law Universitas Airlangga, page 162. 
3  See Watiah and Kusriyah, “Tinjauan Yuridis Hubungan 
Lembaga Negara antara DPD dengan DPR dalam Sistem 
Bicameral”, Jurnal Hukum Khaira Ummah, Vol. 3 No. 2, 
September 2008, Semarang:MIH UNISSULA, page 186.   
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) after the 
second amendment of UUD NRI 1945 in 2001, 
about the possibility of a President can not be 
dismissed politically by House of Representatives 
in the presidential system of government. The 
polemic regarding to the legality, propriety and 
consistency to build and to strengthen the presi-
dential system,5 especially when President Ab-
durrahman Wahid was dismissed in the middle of 
his period from his position as president. 6 
Impeachment proccess of President and/ 
or Vice President in UUD NRI 1945 is not regula-
ted firmly on the authority of the Constitutional 
Court to examine the opinion of the House of Re-
presentatives on alleged violations of the law by 
the President and/or Vice President. The issues 
raised in the submission of the alleged violations 
of law to the Court by the House of Representa-
tives, it is not automatically binding on MPR. 
Based on the construction of Article 7B paragraph 
(7) UUD NRI 1945 allows MPR ruling out its deci-
sion even if the President and/or Vice President 
was proved violating law. Based on the substance 
of Article 7B paragraph (7) UUD NRI 1945 above, 
said that the function of the Constitutional Court 
in the context of impeachment of the President 
and/or Vice President is not effective, because 
the Constitutional Court's decision is not binding 
on the members of MPR. Means, a plenary meet-
ing of MPR may produces a different decision 
with the decision of the Constitutional Court. 
The implementations of constitutional court's po-
wer in UUD NRI 1945  tends to emphasize proce-
dural aspect than substantive aspects of the im-
peachment process itself. 
 
Problem 
Based on the description above, thus the 
needs of reflection to study the problems of 
4  Dian Utami Mas Bakar, “Pengujian Konstitusional Undang-
Undang Pengesahan Perjanjian Internasional”, Jurnal Yu-
ridika,  Vol. 29 No. 3, September 2014, Surabaya: Faculty 
of Law Universitas Airlangga, page 288.  
5  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Sejarah Mahkamah Konstitusi RI (1), 
ceramah, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gq1Lxx 
Okr7M, accessed on  July 6, 2015. 
6  Ahmad Syahrizal, “Problematik Implementasi Putusan 
MK”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Vol. 4 No. 1, March 2007, Jakarta: 
MKRI, page 107. 
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Constitution Court authority as regulated  on Ar-
ticle 7B paragraph (7) UUD NRI  1945 in the recon-
struction form of Impeachment of President and/ 
or Vice President in Indonesian constitutional 
system. 
 
Research Methods 
This type of research is normative legal re-
search with some research approaches including 
legislation approach, conceptual approach, his-
torical approach and comparative approach. Col-
lecting legal material is conducted with study 
method of literature in accordance with the ap-
proach used. All legal materials that have been 
collected and inventoried will then be proceed 
and analyzed in depth in order to obtain the ratio 
legis of the legal issues which is studied. Primary 
and secondary legal materials that have been 
systematically synchronized then be further as-
sessed based on law theories in order to obtain 
scientific formula to answer the legal issues 
which is discussed on this law research. 
 
Discussion 
One of the constitutional dynamics which 
obviously shows a close relation between the 
legal and the political process is the process of 
dismissing the President as head of state and 
head of government. President dismissal process 
is known in constitutional practice in many coun-
tries, commonly called as impeachment. 7  
According to Mahmud MD there are two 
models of President and/or Vice President im-
peachment, those are dismissal politically (im-
peachment) and dismissal through a special court 
forum (previli-giatum). Article 7A and 7B emb-
race both models impeachment and previligia-
tum at once. Dismissal by the MPR is a form of 
impeachment models and assessment by the 
Constitutional Court is a model form of previli-
giatum. The intervention of the Constitutional 
                                         
7  Eko Noer Kristianto, “Pemakzulan Presiden Republik In-
donesia Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945”, Jurnal Rechtsvin-
ding, Vol. 2, No. 3, Dec. 2013, Jakarta:BPHN, page 332. 
8  Hananto Widodo, “Politik Hukum Interpelasi Dewan Per-
wakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia”, Jurnal Rechtsvin-
ding, Vol. 1 No. 3, Dec. 2012, Jakarta: BPHN, page 433.  
9  Constitutional Court decision No. 23-26/PUU-VII/2010 
section of expert testimony, Saldi Isra, page. 47. 
Court in the process of dismissing the President 
is hoping that the dismissal of the president are 
not based on purely political grounds but also 
legal reasons. 8 
Impeachment is one of the mechanism 
that constitutionally provided by the UUD NRI  
1945 to replace the President and/or Vice Presi-
dent in their term of office if found in violation 
of the law. Impeachment of President by experts 
is known as extra-ordinary political event in the 
Presidential Government system.9 Impeachment 
is the legal retributive action based on the evi-
dence of law. Unlike the impeachment, impeach-
ment is a procedure where an elected public offi-
cial, indicted for unlawful acts. The political pro-
cess of filing an House of Representatives’s opini-
on to prove whether the President and/or Vice 
President have violated the law or not by the 
Constitutional Court is the process of impeach-
ment, while the concept of impeachment is an 
act of judgment to dismiss the President and/or 
Vice President of the violation that has been 
done.10 
Based on Article 7A UUD NRI  1945, the 
President and/or Vice President may be dismis-
sed in their term of office by the MPR upon the 
recommendation of the House of Representati-
ves, if proven to have violated of the law in the 
form of treason, corruption, bribery, other felo-
nies or misconduct, and if they do not qualify 
again as President and/or Vice President. Article 
7B paragraph (1) of UUD NRI  1945 shows that the 
impeachment process after the amendment of 
UUD NRI  1945 involving three state institutions, 
namely House of Representative, Consti-tutional 
Court, and MPR. The existence of Consti-tutional 
Court as one of the holders of judicial authority 
in the constitutional system of the Republic Indo-
nesia is the implementation idea of constitutio-
nalism and to reinforce the mechanism of checks 
and balances.11 
10  M. Ilham Hermawan and Dian Purwaningrum, “Mekanisme 
Pemberhentian Presiden (Impeachment) dan Kritik Subs-
tansi Pengaturannya Di Indonesia”, Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 
Amanna Gappa, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 2012, Makasar: Fa-
culty of Law Universitas Hasanuddin, page 157. 
11  See Misranto, “Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Konstruksi 
Sistem Peradilan Impeachment”, Jurnal Perspektif, Vol. 
XIX, No. 3, September 2014, Surabaya: UWKS, page 154. 
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Indonesian constitutional history has two 
impeachment of President, which are the Presi-
dent Soekarno and President Abdurrahman Wa-
hid. President Abdurrahman Wahid run the go-
vernment by the controversial of attitudes and 
policies.12 These conditions make the political 
power that brought President Abdurrahman Wa-
hid switched to resistance. The feud between 
President Abdurrahman Wahid began by claiming 
the House of Representatives to President Abdur-
rahman Wahid about the Yanatera Bulog funds 
with the amount of Rp. 35 M and the Sultan of 
Brunei Darussalam help US $ 2 million.13 That ac-
cusation is responded by the House of Represen-
tatives by proposing the uses of rights to do an 
investigation approved in the plenary meeting of 
House of Representatives on August 28, 2000 and 
continued with the establishment of the Special 
Committee on 5 September 2000.14 
President Abdurrahman Wahid took politi-
cal steps by releasing the Presidential Decree 
which states freezing of the House of Represen-
tatives and MPR, preparing the agency to hold 
the general elections within a year, and total re-
formation of the new order elements to freeze 
Functional Groups party (Partai Golongan Kar-
ya).15 That Presidential Decree was rejected by 
the House of Representative that continues on 
the Special Session with the revoke mandate 
agenda of the president with the MPR Decree No. 
III/MPR/2001 concerning Determination of Indo-
nesian Vice President Megawati Soekarno-putri 
as President of the Republic of Indonesia. 
The dismissal of President Abdurrahman 
Wahid be judged unconstitutional and only in-
                                         
12  Ahmad Syahrizal, op. cit, page 107. 
13  Muhammad Bahrul Ulum, “Mekanisme Pemakzulan Presi-
den dan/atau Wakil Presiden Menurut UUD 1945 (Antara 
Realitas Politik dan Penegakan Konstitusi)”, Jurnal Kons-
titusi, Vol. 7, No. 4, August 2010, Jakarta: Sekjen dan Ke-
paniteraan MK, page141. 
14  Muhammad Bahrul Ulum, “Mekanisme Pemakzulan Presi-
den dan/atau Wakil Presiden Menurut UUD 1945 (Antara 
Realitas Politik dan Penegakan Konstitusi)”, Jurnal Kons-
titusi, Vol. 7, No. 4, August 2010, Jakarta: Sekjen dan Ke-
paniteraan MK, page.141. 
15  Eko Noer Kristianto, op.cit., page 337. 
16  Ahmad Syahrizal, op. cit, page 107. 
17  Formation of Constitutuional Court relates to organ theo-
ry (organ established with its role and function). Forma-
tion of Constitutional is affected by working effectivity 
of existed parliamentary members, which are filling pro-
blems, integrity, and other working mechanisms. Filling 
fluenced by the political powers without any le-
gal process. Two principle reasons impeachment 
of President Abdurrahman Wahid, the president 
is committing acts in violation of state policy the-
reby inhibiting the process of constitutional be-
cause it is not agreed to attend and refused to 
give an accountability to the Special Session of 
People's Consultative Assembly.16 Thus that im-
peachment process full with the political nuan-
ced and obviously injure the meaning of Indone-
sia as a law state (rechtsstaat). To avoid a repeat 
of the impeachment process based on political 
reasons, then on third change of UUD NRI 1945 
the new state institution was formed, namely the 
Consti-tutional Court.17 The idea formation of 
Constitutional Court is one of the modern consti-
tutional which appears on the 20th century.18 The 
authority of the Constitutional Court in UUD NRI 
1945 related to impeachment proceedings under 
Article 7B jo. Article 24C paragraph (2). Based on 
Article 7B paragraph (1) UUD NRI 1945 impeach-
ment is not only based on political considera-
tions, but also based on the legal (judicial) logic, 
rationality and accountable.19 
Constitutional Court in the impeachment 
process has the obligation to give a decision on 
the opinion of House of Representative regarding 
to the alleged violations by the President and/or 
Vice President. Constitutional Court examines 
and adjudicates opinion of House of Representa-
tives on the performance of the President and/or 
Vice President which deemed complythe Article 
7A UUD NRI 1945. Examination conducted by 
Constitutional Court is a judicial process that its 
problem appears when alot of manipulations happen in 
mechanism of parliamentary members election, when it 
does not become a problem anymore, problem of integri-
ty appears from parliamentary members and becomes an 
obstacle. See Agung Laksono, “Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia Pasca Amandemen Undang-Undang 
Dasar 1945”, Jurnal Majelis, Vol. 1 No.1. Agustus 2009, 
Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat Republik Indonesia, page 47. 
18  Bambang Sutiyoso, “Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi 
Dalam Pemakzulan Presiden dan/atau Wakil Presiden Di 
Indonesia”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Vol. 7 No. 1 February 2010, 
Jakarta: Sekjen dan Kepaniteraan MK, page 95. 
19  See Dinoroy Marganda Aritonang, “Penerapan sistem 
Presidensil di Indonesia Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945”, 
Jurnal Mimbar Hukum, Vol. 22. No. 2, Juny 2010, Yogya-
karta: Faculty of Law Gadjah Mada,  page 397. 
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decision in the form of justisil decision.20 Based 
on Article 83 of Law No. 24 Year 2003 concerning 
Constitutional Court, there are three possible de-
cisions that may be imposed by the Constitutio-
nal Court are states the petition can not be ac-
cepted, states justify the opinion of House of 
Representatives and states the application is re-
jected. 
At the level of decision-making to states 
the President and/or Vice President have viola-
ted the law or not as described on Article 7A UUD 
NRI 1945, in a plenary session of House of Repre-
sentatives is certainly a political factor enough 
to influence, because the impeachment process 
can be continued depending on the political inte-
rests of the House of Representative’s member, 
Accor-ding to Article 7B paragraph (2) UUD NRI  
1945, the opinion of House of Representatives 
that the President and/or Vice President have 
violated the law or do not qualify anymore as 
President and/or Vice President is in order to 
implement the control function of House of Re-
presentative. The control function according Ar-
ticle 20 A (2) UUD NRI  1945 consists of interpel-
lation Rights, Inquiry and Express the opinion 
Rights. If look at the content of article 7B para-
graph (2) UUD NRI 1945, the control function re-
ferred to in this Article is the right to express 
opinions. However, in the context of the dismis-
sal of the President and/or Vice President becau-
se they have violated to the law, then the uses 
of Right to Express the opinion must be preceded 
by the use of inquiry rights to investigate whet-
her the President and/or Vice President were ac-
tually violated the law. 
Inquiry rights according to Law No. 17 Year 
2014 concerning People's Consultative Assembly, 
House of Representatives, Regional Represen-
tatives Council, and Assembly at provincial is the 
right of House of Representatives to conduct an 
investigation on the implementation of a law 
and/or the Government policy with regard to the 
                                         
20  Laica Marzuki, “Pemakzulan Presiden/Wakil Presiden Me-
nurut Undang-Undang Dasar”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, February 2010, Jakarta: Sekjen dan Kepaniteraan 
MK, page 20. 
21  Irfan Nur Rachman, “Politik Hukum Pengaturan Right to 
Vote and Right to be Candidate dalam Undang-Undang 
Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi”, Jurnal Konstitusi, 
important things, strategically, and have broad 
impact on society, nation and state that alle-
gedly discord to the law regulations. 
The function of inquiry rights in this case 
is a form control of the House of Representative 
to the President. House of Representative con-
trol against President is a form of checks mecha-
nism and balances between state institutions.21 
This is as ada-gium propounded by Lord Acton are 
"Power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts 
absolutely".22 This inquiry rights  if the presi-dent 
proved to have violated can continue on the 
Rights Express Opinion which is a form of official 
opinion as defined in Article 7A UUD NRI 1945. 
Rights Express Opinion will be brought on Consti-
tutional Court to be examined and decided, if 
Constitutional Court decided to the President 
and/or Vice to President proven to have violated 
to the law, next will be proposed by House of Re-
presentatives to People's Consultative Assembly. 
That Constitutional Court's decision is only 
binding on House of Representatives as an appli-
cant of impeachment as meant in Article 19 para-
graph 5 of the Constitutional Court Regulation 
Number 21 Year 2009 concerning Guidelines Liti-
gation Proceedings In Breaking the House of Re-
presentatives Opinion Regarding Alleged Viola-
tions by President and/or Vice President. Consti-
tutional Court Regulation explicitly mentions 
"Court decisions shall be final and legally binding 
for the House of Representative as applying". The 
problem is that the Constitutional Court ruling is 
only binding on the House of Representative, so 
that MPR is not bound by a decision of the Cons-
titutional Court. 
Involvement of Constitutional Court in im-
peachment process is different in each country, 
it depends on governmental system used by its 
country and authority given by Constitution to 
Constitutional Court in impeachment process. 
Several countries, such as Thailand in impeach-
ment process is conducted towards state offi-
Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2013, Jakarta: Sekjen dan Kepanite-
raan Mahkamah Konstitusi, page 313. 
22  See Jamin Ginting, ”Perjanjian Internasional dalam Pe-
ngembalian Aset Hasil Korupsi di Indonesia”, Jurnal Dina-
mika Hukum, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2011, Purwo-
kerto: Faculty of Law Universitas Jenderal Soedirman, 
page 436. 
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cials, especially the Prime Minister, which ac-
tually has no authority strong. This is appear in 
the Thai Constitution mentioned in Section 270 
itself is not strong. In Section 270 Constitution of 
The Kingdom of Thailand 2007 stated: “… Presi-
dent of the Constitutional Court …., may be re-
moved from office by the Senate.” 
Authority filed impeachment in the Thai-
land constitution by senate amounted no less 
than ¼ of all Senate members have already filed 
impeachment to public officials, the impeach-
ment may also be filed by at least 20,000 citizens 
of Thailand who already have vote right that 
signed a petition for filed to the Thailand Senate. 
The filing of an impeachment in Thailand has a 
distinction in the process, for the post which is 
not a political office, so that's the authority to 
check fall to Attorney General of Thailand, while 
for political office the authority to check fall in 
Thailand Supreme Court. In a process the one 
who has political office when impeached will be 
examined by the Criminal Division's Supreme 
Court, and if the crime is corruption of political 
officials then checked by the Corruption Eradi-
caton Commission (KPK). After being examined 
by  Supreme Court, then the decision issued is 
final. 
As in Thailand, South Korea was a lot of 
public office that can be impeached, in accor-
dance Article 65 Constitution of The Republic of 
Korea 1987 states that: “In case the President, 
…., the National Assembly may pass motions for 
their impeachment.” For filing impeachment to 
public officials other than the president must be 
filed by 1/3 of Parliament members, while presi-
dent must be filed by 2/3 of the number of Par-
liament members. During the impeachment pro-
cess is carried out, the officials concerned must 
be disabled from his position and the decision of 
an impeachment not only cause the officer lost 
his job, but can also be prosecuted in a civilly or 
criminal liability. 
The impeachment based on UUD NRI  1945 
be done because there was lawlessness and mis-
conduct that was done by the President and/or 
                                         
23  Compare to Lisdhani Hamdan Siregar, “Implikasi Putusan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Pemakzulan Presiden dan/ 
atau Wakil Presiden di Indonesia”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Vol. 
Vice President, therefore the impeachment com-
pletion should be through legal liability, not poli-
tical accountability. The Constitutional Court de-
cision in Article 24C paragraph (2) UUD NRI 1945 
can be given strong legitimacy as the authority 
of Constitutional Court which is regulated in Ar-
ticle 24C paragraph (1) UUD NRI  1945, which in-
dicates that the Constitutional Court's decision is 
final. Thus the Constitutional Court decision 
should be the Parliament institutional opinion no 
longer be a proposal which was taken at the 
plenary meeting of the Assembly. 
The plenary meeting of the Assembly 
should be the Parliament proposal legalization 
forum that has proved a foul through the decision 
of the Constitutional Court.  Therefore, the quo-
rum system in a plenary session of the Assembly 
must be disregarded because of differences in 
the context of the plenary meeting to another, 
in order to minimize the political process into the 
legal process. This is in accordance with Article 
1 (3) UUD NRI  1945 which states that Indonesia 
is a country of law (rechtstaat) is not a state ba-
sed on power alone (machtstaat).23 
Based on the description above, required 
norm completeness in Article 24C paragraph (2) 
UUD NRI 1945 which states that Contitutional 
Court decision into alleged violations of law by 
the President and/or Vice President shall be final 
and binding not only on Parliament as stated in 
PMK No. 21  Year 2009, however bind well to the 
MPR, because Contitutional Court decision is er-
ga omnes means legal effects binding everyone. 
The Assembly Entanglement in the Constitutional 
Court's decision should be realized in the reflec-
tion of Article 7B paragraph (5), (6) and (7) the 
Constitution was changed to UUD NRI 1945 to 
authorize/upheld the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court. Thus the legal liability embodiment to 
president of the offense can not be separated 
because of the political process alone. More than 
that to implement in Indonesia as a state of law 
must be minimized so that the elements in the 
main political impeachment case against the 
president who violated the law. 
9, No. 2, June 2012, Jakarta: Sekjen Kepaniteraan MK, 
page 290. 
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Conclusion 
Based on the statement above, one pur-
pose establishment of the Constitutional Court in 
order to avoid unconstitutional process impeach-
ment, even though the authority of Constitutio-
nal Court in the process impeachment was not 
effective due to the norms in UUD NRI 1945 con-
cerning impeachment. The fact that although has 
set explicitly in UUD NRI 1945, impeachment pro-
cedure still has quite complicated problems, 
where Article 7B paragraph (7) UUD NRI  1945 has 
not quite provide the answer whether the Assem-
bly should be bound by the decision of the Court. 
Thus it should be, first, upheld the ruling of Cons-
titutional Court related to violation of the law 
and misconduct that was done by the President 
and/or Vice President, the second plenary meet-
ing of the Assembly only aims to ratify the Consti-
tutional Court desicion, to minimize the political 
process of impeachment, so that the synchroni-
zation between Constitutional Court decision and 
a Assembly decision, because the Court decision 
is erga omnes. 
 
Recommendations 
UUD NRI  1945 needs to be changes related 
impeachment, because, first, gives broad autho-
rity to Parliament related inquiries and investiga-
tion of law violations of law or misconduct com-
mitted by the President and/or Vice President, 
Second, it need for completeness norm in Article 
24C paragraph (2) UUD NRI 1945 which states 
that the Court decision on alleged law violations 
and misconduct by the President and/or Vice 
President is final and binding not only on Parlia-
ment as stated in PMK No. 21 Year 2009; Third, 
the Constitutional Court ruling binds to Assem-
bly, because the Constitutional Court's decision 
is erga omnes means legal effects binding on 
everyone. 
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